by David J. BercusonLegion Magazine is pleased to introduce Eye On Defence, a new regular column focusing on matters related to National Defence and the Canadian Forces today. Historian David J. Bercuson is the director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.
Some time within the next year or so we will likely see the launch of a major review of Canadian defence policy aimed at the issuance of a new White Paper. The last White Paper was issued in 1994 when David Collenette was still defence minister. It examined Canada’s domestic and international defence commitments and requirements at the end of the Cold War within the context of the federal government’s then-current policy of severe spending constraints. Those limitations arose from the government’s need to tackle its close to $40 billion per year annual budgetary deficit. The key defence question facing the government in 1993 was how to cut the defence budget while avoiding ‘rust-out’ and maintaining a minimal but still credible Canadian Forces.
Although most of the strategic assumptions underlying the 1994 White Paper are still valid, the government’s fiscal position is much changed. The government acknowledged that almost a year ago when announcing an increase to the defence budget of close to $2 billion. Despite that increase, however, budget pressures on the Canadian Forces continue to build. In addition, the task of keeping current in both technological innovation and leadership development is far costlier today than it was even a decade ago.
At the time that public input was being sought prior to 1994, the major fault line of debate separated those who believed in maintaining full combat-capability for the Canadian Forces and those who advocated a more lightly armed force, along the lines of a gendarmerie, that would meet domestic security requirements and be capable of deployment in traditional, non-interventionist peacekeeping operations.
The 1994 White Paper came down on the side of those who advocated a fully armed, conventional, military and concluded that “the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces” was in the national interest. That conclusion was prescient. The Canadian Forces learned in Bosnia, Rwanda, and other venues that post-Cold War peacekeeping operations require a fully combat-capable military. But what still needs to be determined is just what “combat capable” ought to mean for the Canadian Forces.
Combat-capability can only be defined within the larger issue of the CF’s future force structure. The 1994 White Paper points out that opting for a combat-capable military does not mean that Canada has to possess every component of military capability, but does not clearly define what capabilities the future CF ought to have. The CF’s current visioning document, Shaping The Future Of Canadian Defence: A Strategy For 2020 issued in June 1999, is not much clearer. It calls for the CF to design a viable and affordable force structure by 2004, but leaves to future study the determination of what force structure will best meet Canadian needs up to the year 2020.
Whether the CF structure is ultimately determined by the government in a new White Paper, or by the brass at National Defence Headquarters, the task will not be an easy one. Though the CF is fully committed to “jointness” in planning, executing, and sustaining operations, the concept of unification is in some ways weaker today than at any time since Paul Hellyer’s “reforms” in the late 1960s. No one at National Defence Headquarters will publicly admit it, but there is probably as much internecine budgetary rivalry among our officially non-existent ‘Army’, ‘Navy’, and ‘Air Force’ today as there was before unification. That isn’t surprising when budgetary pressures are the norm, but it does lead to policy realities that will cause untold headaches for those who will try to shape the CF force structure.
Take the question of how to replace—and with what—the tank now used by Canada’s army. Though the recent turret modifications to the Leopard C-1 have extended its useful life, the Canadian Leopard is outmoded. If they were to be deployed in an intense air-land battle, they would be quickly wiped out by forces deploying first line equipment. The Leopards were invaluable for patrolling in post-ceasefire Kosovo, but they would have been death traps had the Lord Strathcona’s Horse taken part in a forced break-in into Kosovo.
A modern infantry must fight alongside a direct-fire vehicle of some sort. When the Leopard is ready for the scrap heap, what should it be replaced with? It will be difficult to make a good decision if a rational force structure is not in place. The armoured corps would give its eye teeth for a new heavy tracked vehicle. The tankers will no doubt point out that moving from tracked to wheeled direct-fire support vehicles will undermine Canadian combat-capability.
They will be correct to an extent—a wheeled vehicle will diminish the current combat capability of the Canadian army. But will that reduction in capability be marginal or will it be so central to future army missions as to render the army combat-incapable?
To buy enough main battle tanks, or MBTs, to equip Canada’s three Regular Force armoured regiments, maintain them at establishment strength, and for training purposes will be expensive. And purchasing them would only be the beginning of the huge costs involved in acquiring such a vehicle. If the CF acquires modern MBTs, it must acquire the capability of transporting them, maintaining them over three decades at least, upgrading their software and so on. Will the air force brass be happy if Canada buys MBTs only to forego the next generation of fighters? Will the navy be willingly to chop their blue water capability to sustain the tanks?
What the CF is now, in essence, is a small, “big” military. The navy has no cruisers or carriers, but it has destroyers, frigates, submarines, minesweepers, and replenishment vessels. The air force has no strategic bombers, cruise missiles, or attack helicopters, but it has multi-role fighters, tactical helicopters, maritime helicopters and a large variety of transport aircraft. The army has everything from kevlar helmets to tanks. But why this great variety of kit?
The answer is that the CF has what it has because the navy, air force, and army brass believe this kit is necessary for a traditional combat-capable military!
That is not a good enough answer any more. “Combat-capable” is not a precise definition; it does not by itself, have much intrinsic meaning and it can have different definitions in different settings. Canadians can’t expect the brass to give it meaning because too much self-interest will be involved. The government must make the ultimate decision in a new White Paper after appropriate consultation. The new force structure must allow Canada’s armed forces to prepare for a range of operations, from limited Korea-style wars to operations other than war in a logical and cost-efficient way. That will probably call for a “niche” or “boutique” military that will retain combat capability, but not over as wide a range of possible operations as at present. This will probably be a bitter pill for the brass to swallow, but it is going to be the only way Canada will be able to sustain first-class fighting forces over the next quarter century.
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