PHOTO: SGT. FRANK HUDECK, CANADIAN FORCES COMBAT CAMERA

General Rick Hillier has set the tone for the Canadian Forces with the Defence Policy Statement issued in April.

As of this writing, in early July, no one seems quite sure of the eventual fate of the Defence Policy Statement issued April 19.

Some of the people who work for the director general of Public Affairs have been told adamantly not to refer to it as a “white paper.” A white paper is usually defined as a policy statement that is definitive and which is issued only after wide consultation with the public and various interested parties.

The 1994 Defence White Paper emerged only after such consultation, done by a joint committee of the House of Commons and Senate, across Canada. The current Defence Policy Statement is essentially the vision of a small group of people within National Defence Headquarters and most particularly the chief of defence staff, General Rick Hillier.

Hillier’s formal title may imply that he is merely the senior “staff” officer of the Canadian Forces, primarily charged as other chiefs of the defence staff have been, with the job of force generation for overseas operations. Many chiefs have played just that role and little more. But as Douglas Bland pointed out in his seminal book Chiefs of Defence back in 1995, other chiefs did not. In reality, as Bland shows, the job definition is rather loose–the CDS is primarily the chief military advisor to the prime minister. In recent years, with the re-establishment of the three environmental chiefs in Ottawa in the mid-1990s as a cost saving measure, it seems to have evolved more into a chair of the board position.

Hillier is determined to change the CDS job into a position akin to what the Americans call commander-in-chief.

First, the Defence Policy Statement is, in fact, a reflection of Hillier’s “commander’s intent,” drawn up by him in late 2004.

Second, Hillier knows that large portions of the Defence Policy Statement can be implemented directly by National Defence Headquarters without waiting for any parliamentary review or public insight, and he has already moved to do so.

Third, Hillier has taken on himself to sell his “commander’s intent” across the country to press, public and politicians alike.

Fourth, Hillier has implemented a reorganization of the top layers of NDHQ that will leave the environmental chiefs in place but will relegate their role to force generation.

Finally, he has made “jointness” and “transformation” into the watchwords of the Hillier generation and he is building a team around him of leaders who share that vision, many of whom he has worked with before.

All this is good. The Canadian Forces have got a commander who will command, who is adverse to risk aversion, and who is determined to expunge the bureaucratic culture that has long gripped the high command.

But barring some unforeseen miracle, Hillier will sooner or later run up against the reality that Canadian governments either know little about how to use the Canadian military, or that they too often fall to the temptation to use the military in ways that are unsuitable for the military and not in Canada’s national interest.

The nation had an indication of this past spring when Prime Minister Paul Martin announced that Canada would send about a hundred “unarmed” Canadian Forces observers to Darfur, Sudan, without first checking with either the Sudanese government or the African Union.

That announcement created a political mess. It left unexplained the key question of just what 100 unarmed Canadian soldiers might have done in that vast hell hole that is the raging civil war in southern Sudan. But it also posed the central question of why the government was acting in direct contradiction to both the spirit and the letter of the Defence Policy Statement it had issued bare weeks before.

Hillier has made it quite clear that he fully supports the idea that Canadian overseas operations are extensions of Canadian foreign policy and as such ought to be mounted in ways that will bring decided attention to Canada as an international player. The Defence Policy Statement strongly reflects that view in many ways. And amen to the thought.

So why Darfur? Because the government, once again, bowed to the decades-old urge that Canadian governments have got to get some Canadian military presence at some trouble spot, no matter how token it might be.

Publicly, Hillier stood by the prime minister on the Darfur announcement. It would be most interesting to know his private view.

The episode is troubling for this reason. Rick Hillier is a man with a mission, he is most decidedly not a caretaker or a chairman of the board. He knows what he wants the Canadian Forces to be and why. As time goes by his vision will be in constant danger of being drowned in the swamp of Ottawa politics. The danger will be even greater as long as minority government prevails. The danger could come in the form of missions assigned to the Forces by the government that contradict Hillier’s vision. It could come in the form of budget promises made but not kept. It could come with a governmental failure to fix a procurement system that is madness in action. Or in other ways.

For the moment, it seems, Hillier has enough to do to implement the beginning of the transformation process, to guide the standing up of Canada Command, to push through with the reorganization of the high command, and to sweep the culture of risk aversion out of NDHQ, and to sell his vision, to pay attention to much else. Maybe he saw the acceptance of the Darfur mission as a small price to pay to keep the momentum going at this early stage of his era. But sooner or later, the danger of a collision will mount.

Canada has had several active, spirited, and imaginative chiefs since the office was initiated in 1964, but the majority of them served during the Cold War, when everyone knew in what direction to shoot if the balloon went up. The global environment today is much different and more demanding of a CDS. And the pressures from the government on the CDS will be more confusing, contradictory and just plain incorrect than ever. Hillier’s greatest test will lie in his relations with the government. The future of the Canadian Forces as a modern, effective military will rest on the outcome.