Did the government make the right decision in 1941?

Author Carl Vincent of Stittsville, Ont., says NO.

Author J.L. Granatstein of Toronto says YES.

Vincent is the author of a number of articles and books, including No Reason Why—the Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy—an examination. From 1962 to 1995 he was an archivist at Public Archives of Canada/National Archives of Canada. Granatstein has written dozens of books, including Who Killed Canadian Military History? and Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. He is a former director and CEO of the Canadian War Museum.

Canadian soldiers arrive in Hong Kong, November 1941.

PHOTO: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA—C049744

CARL VINCENT

NO

The subject of the dispatch of Canadian troops to Hong Kong during the Second World War is one that has sporadically captured the attention of writers and historians.

In response to a request from the British government in September 1941, Canada agreed to provide troops to reinforce the crown colony. Two battalions previously employed on garrison duty were selected and dispatched along with a headquarters component to Hong Kong, arriving on Nov. 16.

Following the Japanese invasion of the Kowloon peninsula in early December and the invasion of Hong Kong Island on Dec. 18, they fought continuously until the garrison surrendered on Dec. 25. Of the 1,975 Canadians only 1,418 survived, many of whom suffered physical and mental damage from their ordeal.

Many aspects of this tragic event have been the subject of controversy. For this discussion, I am focusing on the question that is asked in the introduction. The request received by Canada on Sept. 19, 1941, had been repeatedly redrafted to expand the political and diplomatic and diminish the military aspects of the request. Beyond stating that one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison “out of all proportion to the numbers involved” it added that it would have a good effect on the colony and show the Chinese and the Americans that Britain was serious about fighting for Hong Kong. Never mentioned was that at all times the British Chief of Staff had viewed Hong Kong incapable of a prolonged defence or of being relieved.

There is no evidence that this was ever brought to the government’s attention either by the U.K. or its own military advisers. When the senior cabinet members asked the Chief of the Canadian General Staff for advice on the subject he claimed that his responsibility in the matter was solely to ascertain the availability of troops. They were available and the War Cabinet agreed to dispatch the force, subsequently testifying that they considered that this could not be refused.

Of the 1,975 Canadians only 1,418 survived, many of whom suffered physical and mental damage from their ordeal.

This knee-jerk “Ready, Aye Ready” response is strange in light of Mackenzie King’s usual attitude to such requests.

The question of the justification of the dispatch of Canadian troops is summarized below.

1.    Could the request have been refused? Undoubtedly it could and Canada would occasionally do so later in the war.
2.    What was the Canadian government’s responsibility? While in a democratic country the government is entitled to deploy its troops for diplomatic or political reasons rather than solely military ones, it is expected to weigh the options and consider the risks. The Canadian government did this in an extremely cursory manner, although sufficient information was undoubtedly available.
3.    Were any of the advantages touted as a reason for this reinforcement achieved? They were not. It is doubtful that the Chinese or Americans even noticed the arrival of the Canadians while if the Japanese did, they ignored it. In the battle, while the Canadians put up a brave and surprisingly effective resistance, the Japanese did not suffer excessive casualties nor were their plans for the capture of Hong Kong and, later, Southeast Asia in any way delayed or disrupted.

With hindsight, one can see the causes of the tragedy, the motivations of some of those involved and even find some small degree of sympathy for the Canadian government—sincere men who wanted Canada to do its part. However, when the ostensible reasons and the actual results are weighed with nothing on the other side of the balance but the hopeless bravery of the defenders it is apparent that neither diplomatic, political, military nor moral considerations justified the dispatch of Canadian troops to Hong Kong.

J.L. GRANATSTEIN

YES

There was no choice: Canada had to send troops to Hong Kong.

We were at war, in effect as a nominally independent power, but still psychologically a British colony. London had asked for troops, the Chief of the General Staff and the army brass in Ottawa agreed that men were available, and the War Cabinet decided to accept the mission.

In hindsight, of course, this was a grave mistake. But hindsight is not the best tool to assess failed military operations. We need to look at the reasons why as they appeared at the time.

First, in the late summer of 1941, Britain was losing the war against Hitler. Hitler was at the gates of Moscow, and the U.S. was neutral. So was Japan, though it was making threatening noises in Asia. The best judgment in London was that Tokyo had not yet decided on war, and any decision might be deterred or deferred by bolstering the defences of possessions like Hong Kong.

No one wanted a war in the Pacific, and anything that might help Japan decide on peace was essential—hence the War Office’s request to Canada for two battalions of infantry.

Canada’s main effort thus far in the war had been to help defend Britain from invasion, and the Canadian Corps overseas was building up. But there had been no action yet for the army, the memory of the glorious Canadian Corps in the Great War was strong, and there was restlessness in the country and the beginning of a campaign for overseas conscription.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King had forged a defence and economic alliance with Washington in 1940-41, and he could read the signs of discontent. If word leaked out, as it would, that Ottawa had refused a British request for troops, the political explosion would be fierce. Canada was concentrating on the defence of North America, critics would shout, not helping Britain to the maximum extent. The government literally had no choice on Hong Kong.

The reality in 1941 was that Canada was a military colony that did almost anything Britain wanted. There was no independent strategic analysis, and the army staff was not yet fully competent.

Was this an informed decision? For all practical purposes, in late 1941 Canada had no independent capacity for intelligence analysis. We picked up some information in Washington, and Ottawa received copies of the telegrams and analyses that London believed necessary. If the British said that Japan might be impressed by the bolstering of Hong Kong’s defences, that in effect was good enough for Ottawa. Yes, the Chief of the General Staff, General Harry Crerar, should have known better. He had studied the defence of Hong Kong when he attended the Imperial Defence College, but he had met recently with a Royal Military College contemporary returning from command of the crown colony and been told the Japanese were no soldiers. The army was on board for the decision.

But the headquarters staff did a terrible job preparing for Hong Kong. The two battalions chosen, the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, had done garrison duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica and neither was fully trained nor up to strength. Still, Hong Kong, so the advice was from London, was expected to be more garrison duty, and there would be time to bring the training up to speed.

Unfortunately, when the battalions shipped out, incompetence at Army Headquarters led to the unit’s transport and other heavy equipment literally missing the boat. Mistake compounded mistake, and the result in December, 1941 was a military disaster.

The reality in 1941 was that Canada was a military colony that did almost anything Britain wanted. There was no independent strategic analysis, and the army staff was not yet fully competent. The soldiers in Hong Kong paid the price for the interwar neglect of the military.