by David J. Bercuson

Sergeant Roger Carrasqueira of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery helps fight a forest fire in McClure, B.C.

When forest fires consumed thousands of square hectares of Alberta and British Columbia this past summer–and a good chunk of the interior B.C. community of Kelowna on Lake Okanagan–more than 700 regular and reserve force soldiers from Land Forces Western Area were mobilized to fight them. Joining hundreds of civilian firefighters already battling the flames, the soldiers were given a quick course in fighting fires and in personal survival, and equipped with shovels and other specialized tools of the trade before joining the fray.

When they did eventually go, beginning in the second week of August, many of the fires they confronted had been burning for weeks. Why were they not deployed much earlier? Part of the answer is surely the ancient means by which military forces may be deployed inside Canada in times of crises.

Few Canadians are familiar with the antiquated and somewhat Byzantine legal structure that must be utilized whenever Canadian soldiers are called upon to help in a domestic emergency. Fewer still are aware that the Canadian Militia–the army reserve forces–bear almost no resemblance to the United States National Guard either in their legal framework, or in the means by which they can be deployed. So although the army is today in the midst of one of the most thorough restructuring and reform of the militia ever, the old rules about when and how the militia can be used, and who pays, remain essentially inviolate.

The militia predates the regular force Canadian army by at least a century. Prior to Confederation in 1867, each of the British North American colonies raised and equipped its own militia. When the framers of British North American union put the young dominion together, however, they rejected any notion that the provinces would control the militia in the same way as the states controlled their own state guards south of the border. Canada would have one source of military power–the national government, which would raise, train and equip the militia–though the provinces would have a legal means to directly call on the militia in case internal emergencies might arise that local law enforcement officials could not handle.

Thus arose the system that is essentially unchanged today; when local emergencies arise, whether natural or human in origin, it is up to the province to request troops–regular or reserve–and to pay for them.

There is one significant shortcut that a local militia unit commander can use if the emergency he or she must respond to is truly dire–in fact where there is an immediate risk to life–and that is to actually launch the unit into action without request and without worrying about who will pay. But such situations would be very rare exceptions because the Canadian Forces are considered the force of last resort.

There have been a number of natural disasters since the mid-1990s–most notably the ice storm in Ontario and Quebec and the floods in Manitoba and Quebec’s Saguenay–when the federal government ended up paying most of the tab for troop deployments. But that “largesse” was ad hoc, and in no way intended to establish any long-term precedent.

In the light of some of the changes the army is planning as part of its long-term reserve restructure project, the antiquarian rules for the deployment of reserves appear downright contradictory to the major aim of having a ready reserve and regular force response to terrorist attack.

This past summer Major-General Ed Fitch, the project manager for Land Force Reserve Restructure, announced his Change Agenda for Phase 2 of the project. Phase 1 was deemed to have been completed in the spring of 2003 when the army reserve reached 15,500 personnel and with the resolution of many of the problems which had been plaguing the army reserves for decades.

The third item on Fitch’s agenda is “Contingency Planning and Homeland Defence”, which is not surprising following the Sept. 11 attacks. Fitch and his team intend to start the ball rolling for an eventual creation of an effective reserve-based chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability. Given that the army reserves are far more widely spread in Canada than the regular forces who are also suffering the stresses of over-tasking, the idea makes perfect sense; create reserve units across that will be trained and equipped to work alongside first responders, police, fire and emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction. Those units would also have the capacity to deploy abroad if necessary.

There are, however, two major flaws in this otherwise commendable plan and neither falls within the provenance of the military. First, militia service in Canada is still entirely voluntary; no one can be “called out” who does not wish to be, short of the introduction of conscription. Second, Ottawa must wait for a provincial request before it can act.

In the first instance, quick response can be stymied if key reservists simply declare “Sorry, tonight is bowling night.” In the second instance, a provincial government could decide to wait as long as possible before calling in the reserves to see whether the local first responders–who they are already paying for–might not be able to handle an emergency before asking for the possible additional expense of the military.

In the aftermath of 2001, the government did advance proposals–inadequate but at least on point–which would have addressed some of these problems. But they were withdrawn in early 2002 and have since to reappear in any form.

It makes no sense to perpetuate a legislative and fiscal framework for internal militia deployment that evolved when corduroy roads and river steamers linked the muddy capitals of the new provinces to the back woods capital of the new dominion, while building a modern capability for the Canadian military to respond to domestic crises.

Here is another crucial national defence priority that awaits the new prime minister; pray that the terrorists wait also.