Mark Zuehlke says No

The lack of battle experience undoubtedly had its due effect,” historian Colonel Charles P. Stacey concluded in his analysis of Canada’s army during the Normandy Campaign. “They did well, but they would certainly have done better had they not been learning the business as they fought.” Stacey’s disappointment with First Canadian Army’s performance is evident, but is it valid?

Canada’s soldiers struggled during this long, costly campaign at all levels—from privates advancing through grain fields under fire to generals managing the operations. It’s worth remembering, however, that while the Canadian army grew to more than 600,000 officers and men during the war, that juggernaut bloomed out of the country’s Permanent Force of just 5,000 all ranks and a militia of some 50,000. Most Canadians who landed in Normandy were not professional soldiers.

Instead, as veteran Reginald H. Roy observed in 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, “they had a keen, if quiet, sense of duty and perseverance. They had all volunteered, and in the fire of battle their determination to complete the job was strengthened.” The 18,444 First Canadian Army casualties, 5,021 of these killed in action or having died of wounds, stands as stark testimony to the intensity of the struggle and its costs.

All Allied armies in Normandy suffered heavy losses and faced command challenges from the bottom to the top. Despite meeting weaker German divisions, the Americans mired in the hedgerows crossing their front. The British, directly commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, were stymied far too long in taking Caen, then botched the Operation Goodwood breakout from the city toward Falaise. Ultimately the Canadians had to take over that advance.

During the four days of Totalize, the Canadians shattered the German cordon.

The first Canadian push toward Falaise—the attack on Verrières Ridge on July 25—was a disaster, a result more of hurried and poor planning by Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds than its execution by 2nd Infantry Division. After that, however, Simonds launched Operation Totalize, unquestionably the Normandy Campaign’s most successful and innovative offensive.

The decision to improvise armoured personnel carriers by modifying M7 self-propelled guns enabled the infantry to advance in concert with the armoured regiments. Nicknamed Kangaroos, this thoroughly Canadian invention proved a game changer for future British and Canadian operations. During the four days of Totalize, the Canadians shattered the German cordon—advancing 15 kilometres and halfway to Falaise. They did so despite facing a defence in depth offered by 11 German infantry battalions, richly supported by 12th SS Panzer Division battle groups and much artillery.

Operation Tractable followed, then the grinding fight to close the Falaise gap ended the campaign.

It’s fitting to give Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower the final analysis: “Without the great sacrifices made here by the Anglo-Canadian armies in the series of brutal, slugging battles, first for Caen and then for Falaise, the spectacular advances made elsewhere by the Allied forces could never have come about.”

John Boileau says Yes

There is no perfect military campaign. The most a battlefield commander can hope for is success with minimal losses. By the end of the Normandy Campaign, Canada had fielded First Canadian Army, which included II Canadian Corps consisting of one armoured and two infantry divisions. Altogether, these forces provided two armoured and seven infantry brigades, plus attached British and Polish formations. Canadian soldiers, most of them in their first battle, fought bravely and eventually overcame experienced German defenders.

But did their formation commanders make the most of the various opportunities offered them? Examples at each level demonstrate they did not.

The two assault brigades could not make it off the beaches in a timely fashion—certainly understandable given the circumstances—causing the reserve brigade to land late. No one told Major-General Rod Keller, commander 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, the navy had closed one of the beaches, forcing the reserve brigade to land at one already overcrowded beach. The resulting traffic jam caused a critical delay.

Meanwhile, some commanders reverted to a training mentality. One night, after several failed attempts, 4th Canadian Armoured Division commander Major-General George Kitching finally located Brigadier Leslie Booth, commander 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade, asleep in his tank.

At the divisional level, failure to use reconnaissance regiments to locate the enemy and scout terrain, resulted in tanks and infantry blundering into unknown German positions and suffering unnecessary casualties. Plus, there were failures to step in and take charge when brigade commanders lost control.

Did formation commanders make the most of their opportunities? Examples at each level demonstrate they did not.

At the corps level, not understanding the flexibility in timings of tanks and infantry required led to missed opportunities. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps, was an artilleryman by training. He was more familiar with the rigid timings of artillery fire plans, which were not subject to the whims of terrain, weather, minefields, casualties or enemy positions, while such conditions did hinder or stop tanks and infantry.

There was also failure to understand and implement manoeuvre warfare. During operations Totalize and Tractable, Simonds lined up tanks and newly invented armoured personnel carriers in parade-ground fashion. Armoured regiments were squeezed into space normally used by a squadron, which caused the loss of tanks and their crews. 

Then, in complete contradiction of accepted armoured procedures, Simonds had tanks lead at night. They moved slowly and were essentially blind.

Lastly, First Canadian Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, became operational in late July. While Simonds was commanding the equivalent of two corps and operations were beginning to fall apart, Crerar did not step in and take control, but merely observed it.

There is perhaps no greater indication of the failure of formations to seize the opportunities offered them than the fact that by the end of the campaign, one division commander and six brigade commanders were replaced. Keller likely would have been fired, too, had he not been wounded on Aug. 8, while Booth also probably should have been let go.