In June a platoon from the Royal 22nd Regiment based in Valcartier, Que., embarked on a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti, under command of the Brazilian Army. The story received little press in Canada.  Indeed, the whole operation—from the diplomatic arrangements and agreements to the pre-deployment training begun in April of the Canadian troops going to Brazil—was little publicized in Canada even though this was the first time a Canadian contingent would operate as part of a Brazilian formation and one of the first peacekeeping missions undertaken by Canada in a very long time.

When it comes to defence news in Canada, it has long been the practice in Ottawa to say as little as possible about anything and the new Haiti mission is no exception. Admittedly it is a small operation, but it is an important one because it shows that Ottawa is making an effort, however minimal, to work with one of South America’s most important countries and that peacekeeping is not entirely dead as a mission for Canadian military personnel.

Canadian governments have long intended to strengthen ties to Central and South American countries and some gains have been made in the last decade or so. Free trade agreements have been concluded and diplomatic and military representation has been increased. But for the most part, Ottawa has had neither the resources nor the opportunities to work with South America other than in a largely token manner. Sending a platoon of infantry is in itself largely a token move, but at least it is a tangible one that does demonstrate the willingness of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to serve under South American command and to learn much more about the way the Brazilian Army operates.

Then there is the peacekeeping angle to this mission. In the mid-1990s Canada literally deployed thousands of troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Today there are fewer than 75, including the platoon just dispatched to Haiti. There are many complex and interrelated reasons for the drastic decline in Canada’s participation in UN missions, most of which are rooted in the end of the Cold War, UN failures in the 1990s in places such as Rwanda and the Balkans, and the decision by both the Paul Martin and Stephen Harper governments to wholeheartedly commit Canada to the war in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization training mission in Afghanistan is still Canada’s largest offshore operation (950 troops), but it will end in the next 12 months, giving the CF–and particular the army–a much needed operational pause.

Might Canada then begin to renew its interest in UN operations? Might the small mission to Haiti portend yet another change in the military’s hot and cold relationship to UN missions?

It is certainly possible and, depending on the missions chosen, might be an effective way for Canada to project military power to advance Canadian national interests. Canada is still a member of the G7 (G8 when Russia is included), but by economic measurements alone, Canada doesn’t deserve to be there anymore because the Canadian economy is rapidly slipping behind those of other nations such as India, China and Brazil. Yet as a trading nation it is vitally important for Canada to either maintain as high a profile as possible in the international community using whatever instruments of national power are available, and to make key allies of countries such as Brazil. When combat missions are necessary for the defence of Canada, Canadians or Canadian interests, then they must be undertaken. But when they are not, Canada could turn again to peacekeeping as a non-combat alternative.

Canada ought to establish clear policies to govern possible future peacekeeping missions by its troops. First and foremost, the missions should be ones that directly serve Canadian national interests. Second, Canada ought to insist on effective political and/or diplomatic representation in the planning and execution of mission objectives. Third, Canada ought to satisfy itself that the overall command and control of the mission will be effective and the lines of supply and communication are capable. Finally, Canada should always insist on a senior partner (or partners) who are effective, capable and thoroughly up to date in military operations.  That will often, but not necessarily always, mean the United States.

The small Canadian mission to Task Force Port-au-Prince should be closely studied for any lessons and precedents that the Canadian Forces may be tasked with in similar missions in the future.